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Feb. 1997 Digests

Happy Hacker Digest Feb. 1, 1997
____________________________________
This is a moderated list for discussions of *legal* hacking. Moderator is
Carolyn Meinel. Please don't send us anything you wouldn't email to your
friendly neighborhood narc, OK? Send posts to . Better
yet,
To subscribe or unsubscribe, use the subscribe boxes on the menubar. If you decide you just want to
use the forum and not get these mailings, I promise my feelings won't get
hurt if you unsubscribe from this list. Happy hacking!
---------------------------------------------------------

Moderator: Get the inside dope about who us characters really are who run
the Happy Hacker list from
http://verbosity.wiw.org. Yes, there you will find an interview that reveals
the dark secrets of the Jerry Cochrane/Patrick Rutledge/Carolyn Meinel tong.
Muhahaha... But maybe we'll have to come up with a more glamorous name for
our gang than Happy Hacker. Hmmm, Wizards of Deception ... Masters of the
Apocalypse ... Non-Newbies of the Netherworld...

Moderator: The Windows NT saga continues. It turns out to be buggy as heck.
(Gloat time: remember, you HH old-timers, that back in Oct. I predicted this
would turn out to be the case.) If you want to make your mark in the world
as a truly elite hacker, now is your chance by becoming one of the
discoverers of these flaws. To stay in the middle of these exciting
discoveries, and publicize your own, join the following email list:

> Windows NT BugTraq Mailing List
>
> In the tradition of Aleph One's BugTraq mailing list, this list
> has been created to invite the free and open discussion of
> Windows NT Security Exploits/Bugs or *SEBs* as I call them. This
> list is not intended to be a forum to discuss "how to" issues, but
> instead should be used to report reproducible SEBs which you have
> personally encountered with Windows NT or its related BackOffice
> products.
>
> Q:What is a SEB?
> A:Anything that can be done to a Windows NT installation via a
>   remote connection (network or RAS) or through the local
>   installation of commercial software which causes Windows NT to
>   react in anything but an expected fashion. So telnet to TCP port
>   135 and typing 15 characters thereby causing the Windows NT CPU
>   to go to 100% utilization would be an acceptable topic. Sitting
>   at a console logged in as Administrator and removing the
>   Administrator's file permissions on the %systemroot%\system32
>   would not be considered an acceptable topic.
>
> Do's:
> - Discuss SEB resolution or workaround.
> - Discuss SEBs in third-party Windows NT products, providing that
>   the product is designed for BackOffice.
> - Discuss Macintosh, Netware, or Samba/Unix-related SEBs assuming
>   that the SEB is related to Windows NT involvement.
>
> Don'ts:
> - Discuss Windows '95, unless, and only if, the Windows NT SEB
>   can only be reproduced with a Windows '95 client.
> - Discuss Windows for Workgroups or Windows 3.x, for any reason.
> - Discuss products to enhance security, unless they have been
>   proven to resolve an outstanding SEB.
> - Discuss Unix SEBs, these should be addressed to
>   BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG (subscribe through LISTSERV@NETSPACE.ORG)
> - Discuss general Windows NT Security, how to, what to, why to,
>   type questions. The NTSecurity@ISS.net list (subscribe through
>   MAJORDOMO@ISS.NET) would be a better forum to discuss these
>   issues.
>
> Vendor involvement in the list is not discouraged, but I would
> ask that you not use this forum as a method of advertising the
> value of your products. If a SEB shows a weakness in Windows NT
> design, and your product can resolve that weakness, a short note
> indicating TECHNICALLY how your product addresses the issue would
> be consider appropriate. If you don't address the issue in a
> technical fashion your subscription will be revoked.
>
> Now after reading all of this you'll probably wonder why I'm
> being so restrictive. For one, I want to keep the volume low, as
> low as possible. I want to keep the content as pertinent as I
> possibly can so that the list becomes a useful tool for everyone
> using Windows NT. If the list can remain on topic, people will
> post SEBs here first, and we will all have an opportunity to
> address the issues in a way best suited to our environments.
>
> I would also make a couple of recommendations to you prior to you
> posting a security exploit/bug.
>
> 1. Don't post SEBs unless you have been able to reproduce it. If
>    the subscriber base grows as I expect it will, posting such
>    messages may cause many people to waste valuable time trying
>    to reproduce something which is not there.
>
> 2. When posting a SEB, make sure you include enough relevant
>    information about your configuration to make it possible to
>    reproduce your scenario. Versions of the relevant software,
>    service pack levels of your system, platform, and any
>    configuration information which might affect the issue. By
>    doing this you will prevent a lot of messages asking you the
>    basic questions and make resolution or workaround that much
>    quicker.
>
> 3. When posting a resolution or workaround, if you have received
>    a Microsoft Knowledgebase Article number (a Q#####), please
>    post it with your message so everyone can read it if they want.
>
> 4. Remember your Non-Disclosure Agreements. Issues pertaining to
>    products covered under NDA should not be discussed here, use
>    the appropriate Microsoft Newsgroup for these issues.
>    Typically, once a product has been released to public beta
>    testing your NDA changes to one limiting you from discussing
>    performance characteristics of the product. Please check with
>    your Microsoft representative or Beta Administration if you
>    are at all unsure of your NDA status prior to posting.
>
> This list operates on a confirmation basis. Your subscription,
> and every message you post to this list will generate a
> confirmation message from LISTSERV@RC.ON.CA. This is there for
> your protection to ensure that subscription requests really are
> from the actual individual email address. It is also there to let
> you think about your message prior to it being posted. This is
> not a configurable option.
>
> I hope that the list proves useful to you and your organization.
 With the REview option turned off, I hope that it will attract
> individuals in organizations who have the ability to address the
> issues which get raised on this list. I know from personal
> experience that having to pay Microsoft US$195 in order to report
> a bug (despite the fact you get a refund 3 or 4 days later) can
> often mean the difference between reporting a bug and not. This
> list should provide an alternative to that process, and at the
> same time, should allow the rest of the Windows NT community the
> opportunity both to take up the issue with their own Microsoft
> representatives, and protect themselves from the possible
> exploits which a SEB might expose them to.
>
> The objective is to get SEB resolution done faster, better, and
> with less risk to the Windows NT customer than currently exists.
>
> To subscribe to this Listserv, send a message to
> Listserv@rc.on.ca with
>
> SUB NTBUGTRAQ Your Name
> SUB NTBUGTRAQ Russ Cooper (for example)
>
> Cheers,
> Russ
 R.C. Consulting, Inc. - NT/Internet Security Consulting
 

From: dmclean@mail.island.net
Subject: Wow...

Wow...

I found your guides just great. They were so helpful and you seemed
to cover everything. But I did have two quick questions:

1.  As I was Port surfing around I came upon a site with a command called
"Adduser". Is this what I think it is? Could I be making my own user
 accounts?

2. After I find a computer with security hole, I don't know what to
do from there on. I don't want to make any stupid mistakes. Could you
please help me.

Thanks a Lot!

From: RadBite@aol.com
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 1997 04:24:59 -0500 (EST)
To:
Subject: C Compiler

Concerning the C++ compiler.

Try aol's file libaries.  They have an C compiler.  I have a copy, and would
be willing to mail it to the person whom wants it as an e-mail attachment.

Make me Anon.!

I have found a sendmail program that is ver. 7.?.?.
That is not what it says but I can not remember.
Anyway I do not have to login or use the "helo" command at all.
This is just for verification this is a good place to send fake e-mail
right?
Also I am thinking of sending an anon e-mail to there system administrator
through
there port 25 and warning them that there are some security leaks in your
server.
Is that really stupid?
I know this sounds newbieish but that is what I am a newbie.

(Moderator: you are absolutely right, old sendmail versions are a major
security risk. If I were you, yes, I'd send the sysadmin an email warning
him or her of the problem. I definitely would not try out any of the
sendmail exploit programs to gain root access to that system.)

(Moderator: following are some security advisories that should be of
especial interest to advanced newbie to intermediate hackers.)

Approved-By: aleph1@UNDERGROUND.ORG
X-Sender: soulet@imhotep.cst.cnes.fr
Date:  Tue, 28 Jan 1997 10:01:25 +0100
Reply-To: Gilles Soulet <Gilles.Soulet@CST.CNES.FR>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG>
From: Gilles Soulet <Gilles.Soulet@CST.CNES.FR>
Subject:      Another NT CPU Hog ?
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG

I can put any NT server I have on its knees by just
connecting to a shared network drive on the server
(for example from a PC running Windows 95) and
transfer a large file file (>100 MBytes) from/to the server.

File transfer begins normally, but after few seconds, the
poor NT box is completely frozen. File transfer continues
normally, but eat 100% CPU time (he, sounds familiar, isn't it ?)

Is anybody able reproduce this "bug" ?

   ~Gillus
Approved-By: aleph1@UNDERGROUND.ORG
Date:  Tue, 28 Jan 1997 16:27:31 -0700
Reply-To: Alfred Huger <ahuger@SECNET.COM>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@netspace.org>
From: Alfred Huger <ahuger@SECNET.COM>
Subject:      Re: [NTSEC] CPU 100% Update (fwd)
X-To:         Aleph One <aleph1@DFW.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org

On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Aleph One wrote:
>
> Finally, on the issue of NT DNS. There was a security advisory sent out
> by Secure Computing indicating that NT DNS could be exploited by sending

The advisory was released by Secure Networks Inc. *Not* Secure Computing.

> results were that between DNS.EXE and SERVICES.EXE the CPU utilization
> was pegged at 100%.

The issue we released an advisory on was the NT DNS server choking and
dying when it received a response for a query it never issued. The patch
provided does not work.

> these problems, but I should warn you that this is not a supported fix

Yep, it is in fact an unsupported patch.

> Given that DNS is one of the things that must be left open, the fact
> that it resolves the CPU 100% utilization problem from Telnet
> connections makes it a good fix in my book. I leave it to you to decide
> if you want to apply it or not. As yet, I have not seen a version for
> Alphas.

While the patch does not work for what *we* reported, it did seem to fix
the 100% CPU usage problem. Cold comfort considering anyone, anywhere on
the Internet can easily *remove* your DNS server.
 

/*************************************************************************
Alfred Huger                                            Phone: 403.262.9211
Secure Networks Inc.                                    Fax: 403.262.9221
"Sit down before facts as a little child , be prepared to give up every
preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and whatever abysses nature
leads, or you will learn nothing" - Thomas H. Huxley
**************************************************************************/

EXPORTABLE CRYPTOGRAPHY TOTALLY INSECURE: CHALLENGE CIPHER BROKEN IMMEDIATELY
 
January 28, 1997 - Ian Goldberg, a UC Berkeley graduate student, announced
today that he had successfully cracked RSA Data Security Inc.'s 40-bit
challenge cipher in just under 3.5 hours.
 
RSA challenged scientists to break their encryption technology, offering a
$1000 award for breaking the weakest version of the code.  Their offering
was designed to stimulate research and practical experience with the security
of today's codes.
 
The number of bits in a cipher is an indication of the maximum level of
security the cipher can provide.  Each additional bit doubles the potential
security level of the cipher.  A recent panel of experts recommended
using 90-bit ciphers, and 128-bit ciphers are commonly used throughout
the world, but US government regulations restrict exportable US products
to a mere 40 bits.
 
Goldberg's announcement, which came just three and a half hours after
RSA started their contest, provides very strong evidence that 40-bit
ciphers are totally unsuitable for practical security.  "This is the
final proof of what we've known for years: 40-bit encryption technology
is obsolete," Goldberg said.
 
The US export restrictions have limited the deployment of technology
that could greatly strengthen security on the Internet, often affecting
both foreign and domestic users.  "We know how to build strong
encryption; the government just won't let us deploy it.  We need strong
encryption to uphold privacy, maintain security, and support commerce on
the Internet -- these export restrictions on cryptography must be
lifted,"  Goldberg explained.  Fittingly, when Goldberg finally
unscrambled the challenge message, it read: "This is why you should use
a longer key."
 
Goldberg used UC Berkeley's Network of Workstations (known as the NOW) to
harness the computational resources of about 250 idle machines.  This allowed
him to test 100 billion possible "keys" per hour -- analogous to safecracking
by trying every possible combination at high speed.  This amount of computing
power is available with little overhead cost to students and employees at
many large educational institutions and corporations.
 
Goldberg is a founding member of the ISAAC computer security research group
at UC Berkeley.  In the Fall of 1995, the ISAAC group made headlines by
revealing a major security flaw in Netscape's web browser.
From: Keith Bostic <bostic@bsdi.com>
X-Loop: cmeinel.com
To: /dev/null@mongoose.bostic.com
Subject: It's very difficult to escape prosecution when your voice is on tape

Forwarded-by: cyerkes <cyerkes@interport.net>

Wiretappers struggle to keep lines open

BY STEPHEN LYNCH
Orange County Register

Law enforcement officials tap as many as 116 telephone lines a day
in Orange County, according to an FBI report that for the first
time details the pervasiveness of electronic surveillance.

The unprecedented disclosure of wiretaps nationwide is part of an
effort by police officers and federal agents to gain access to
high-tech phone systems, which in some cases block traditional
surveillance techniques.

A 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
requires companies such as Pacific Bell and GTE to keep the lines
accessible, even as they upgrade to more reliable, digital
networks.

The FBI report, released last week, said Orange County phone
companies should allow federal, state and local authorities to
monitor up to 194 lines simultaneously, to allow for population
growth.

``Wiretap usage has been going up every year for several years,''
said Frederick Hess, director of the office of enforcement
operations in the Department of Justice. ``It's an indispensable
aid.''

Hess cited Operation Zorro II, a massive drug investigation that
nabbed 150 trafficking suspects in May. Officials tapped phone
lines in a dozen states, including California, to build their
case. Wiretaps also are playing a major role in a case against a
Santa Ana man whom authorities allege is a member of the Mexican
mafia.

``It's very difficult to escape prosecution when your voice is on
tape,'' Hess said. ``We had John Gotti talking about killing
people -- he's dead in the water at that point.''

That power, ironically, is threatened by clearer, faster telephone
systems.

Pacific Bell, for instance, has about 30 stations in Orange County
that route calls, called ``switches.'' Each switch is being
replaced with a computer system that routes digital information.
Before, authorities could place a device on a phone line, called a
``loop,'' and hear the conversation. With a digital system, all
they would hear is the sound of binary beeps, like the static on a
modem.

The software to translate the digits into voices at the switch has
not been developed yet, as phone companies and the FBI negotiate a
reasonable wiretap capacity. It's an expensive proposition, and
Ron Peat, director of federal relations for Pacific Telesis,
complained that authorities are inflating the figures and driving
up the price.

The higher the capacity for wiretaps, the more it costs, and law
enforcement doesn't need access to 194 lines at each station, Peat
maintained.

``What they have done is take the busiest area of the county and
made it the standard for the whole area,'' he said. ``They need to
set priorities.  The office in Brea may never need a wiretap.''

The last estimate by the telephone companies for a nationwide
overhaul is $2 billion. Yet Congress has authorized only $500
million for wiretap capacity, and only $100 million of that has
been released, Peat said.

Pacific Bell has not waited for the problem to be resolved. Some
digital switches are already in place, without the tapping
software, though Peat said no one has needed to monitor the line yet.

The FBI took the wiretap figures from the busiest day in a
16-month period between 1993 and 1995. Orange County ranked third
in California counties for wiretaps, behind Los Angeles (1,080 in
one day) and San Diego (263). The total for the state is 2,569,
but officials warn that the figure is deceptive. Each county's
peak probably was reached on a different day.

The national figure, with the same caveat, is 24,617.

Wiretaps are used mainly by federal authorities, said Carl
Armbrust, chief of narcotics enforcement for the Orange County
District Attorney's Office.

``We've only used it about three times in the last few years,''
said Armbrust, who noted that state wiretap guidelines are more
restrictive than federal rules.

But the overall numbers surprised some civil libertarians and
defense attorneys, who didn't realize wiretaps were so
widespread.

``One hundred and sixteen? Really?'' said Allan Stokke, a criminal
defense attorney in Santa Ana. ``That sounds really high to me.
Many, many judges seem to be giving the authority.''

Stokke worries that prosecutors are not disclosing wiretaps if
evidence from them isn't introduced at trial. He added that the
technological problems ``may be a good thing. It should never be
easy to intrude on people's privacy.''

But Hess said the increased tapping capacity will only keep pace
with the growing population, and remains a small percentage of the
total number of phone lines.

``We're trying to figure out what's within reason for the growth
of the country,'' he said. ``These are all court-ordered taps,
nothing illicit. If we don't do this, there's going to be a big
problem.''

Visit the Register on the World Wide Web at
http://www.ocregister.com/

More--->>

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