Feb. 1997 Digests
Happy Hacker Digest Feb. 1, 1997
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Moderator: The Windows NT saga continues. It turns out to
be buggy as heck.
(Gloat time: remember, you HH old-timers, that back in Oct. I
would turn out to be the case.) If you want to make your mark
in the world
as a truly elite hacker, now is your chance by becoming one of
discoverers of these flaws. To stay in the middle of these exciting
discoveries, and publicize your own, join the following email
> Windows NT BugTraq Mailing List
> In the tradition of Aleph One's BugTraq mailing list, this
> has been created to invite the free and open discussion
> Windows NT Security Exploits/Bugs or *SEBs* as I call them.
> list is not intended to be a forum to discuss "how
to" issues, but
> instead should be used to report reproducible SEBs which
> personally encountered with Windows NT or its related BackOffice
> Q:What is a SEB?
> A:Anything that can be done to a Windows NT installation
> remote connection (network or RAS) or through
> installation of commercial software which causes
Windows NT to
> react in anything but an expected fashion. So
telnet to TCP port
> 135 and typing 15 characters thereby causing
the Windows NT CPU
> to go to 100% utilization would be an acceptable
> at a console logged in as Administrator and
> Administrator's file permissions on the %systemroot%\system32
> would not be considered an acceptable topic.
> - Discuss SEB resolution or workaround.
> - Discuss SEBs in third-party Windows NT products, providing
> the product is designed for BackOffice.
> - Discuss Macintosh, Netware, or Samba/Unix-related SEBs
> that the SEB is related to Windows NT involvement.
> - Discuss Windows '95, unless, and only if, the Windows
> can only be reproduced with a Windows '95 client.
> - Discuss Windows for Workgroups or Windows 3.x, for any
> - Discuss products to enhance security, unless they have
> proven to resolve an outstanding SEB.
> - Discuss Unix SEBs, these should be addressed to
> BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG (subscribe through LISTSERV@NETSPACE.ORG)
> - Discuss general Windows NT Security, how to, what to,
> type questions. The NTSecurity@ISS.net list
> MAJORDOMO@ISS.NET) would be a better forum to
> Vendor involvement in the list is not discouraged, but I
> ask that you not use this forum as a method of advertising
> value of your products. If a SEB shows a weakness in Windows
> design, and your product can resolve that weakness, a short
> indicating TECHNICALLY how your product addresses the issue
> be consider appropriate. If you don't address the issue
> technical fashion your subscription will be revoked.
> Now after reading all of this you'll probably wonder why
> being so restrictive. For one, I want to keep the volume
> low as possible. I want to keep the content as pertinent
> possibly can so that the list becomes a useful tool for
> using Windows NT. If the list can remain on topic, people
> post SEBs here first, and we will all have an opportunity
> address the issues in a way best suited to our environments.
> I would also make a couple of recommendations to you prior
> posting a security exploit/bug.
> 1. Don't post SEBs unless you have been able to reproduce
> the subscriber base grows as I expect
it will, posting such
> messages may cause many people to waste
valuable time trying
> to reproduce something which is not there.
> 2. When posting a SEB, make sure you include enough relevant
> information about your configuration to
make it possible to
> reproduce your scenario. Versions of the
> service pack levels of your system, platform,
> configuration information which might
affect the issue. By
> doing this you will prevent a lot of messages
asking you the
> basic questions and make resolution or
workaround that much
> 3. When posting a resolution or workaround, if you have
> a Microsoft Knowledgebase Article number
(a Q#####), please
> post it with your message so everyone
can read it if they want.
> 4. Remember your Non-Disclosure Agreements. Issues pertaining
> products covered under NDA should not
be discussed here, use
> the appropriate Microsoft Newsgroup for
> Typically, once a product has been released
to public beta
> testing your NDA changes to one limiting
you from discussing
> performance characteristics of the product.
Please check with
> your Microsoft representative or Beta
Administration if you
> are at all unsure of your NDA status prior
> This list operates on a confirmation basis. Your subscription,
> and every message you post to this list will generate a
> confirmation message from LISTSERV@RC.ON.CA. This is there
> your protection to ensure that subscription requests really
> from the actual individual email address. It is also there
> you think about your message prior to it being posted. This
> not a configurable option.
> I hope that the list proves useful to you and your organization.
With the REview option turned off, I hope that it will
> individuals in organizations who have the ability to address
> issues which get raised on this list. I know from personal
> experience that having to pay Microsoft US$195 in order
> a bug (despite the fact you get a refund 3 or 4 days later)
> often mean the difference between reporting a bug and not.
> list should provide an alternative to that process, and
> same time, should allow the rest of the Windows NT community
> opportunity both to take up the issue with their own Microsoft
> representatives, and protect themselves from the possible
> exploits which a SEB might expose them to.
> The objective is to get SEB resolution done faster, better,
> with less risk to the Windows NT customer than currently
> To subscribe to this Listserv, send a message to
> Listserv@rc.on.ca with
> SUB NTBUGTRAQ Your Name
> SUB NTBUGTRAQ Russ Cooper (for example)
R.C. Consulting, Inc. - NT/Internet Security Consulting
I found your guides just great. They were so helpful and you
to cover everything. But I did have two quick questions:
1. As I was Port surfing around I came upon a site with
a command called
"Adduser". Is this what I think it is? Could I be making
my own user
2. After I find a computer with security hole, I don't know
do from there on. I don't want to make any stupid mistakes. Could
please help me.
Thanks a Lot!
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 1997 04:24:59 -0500 (EST)
Subject: C Compiler
Concerning the C++ compiler.
Try aol's file libaries. They have an C compiler.
I have a copy, and would
be willing to mail it to the person whom wants it as an e-mail
Make me Anon.!
I have found a sendmail program that is ver. 7.?.?.
That is not what it says but I can not remember.
Anyway I do not have to login or use the "helo" command
This is just for verification this is a good place to send fake
Also I am thinking of sending an anon e-mail to there system
there port 25 and warning them that there are some security leaks
Is that really stupid?
I know this sounds newbieish but that is what I am a newbie.
(Moderator: you are absolutely right, old sendmail versions
are a major
security risk. If I were you, yes, I'd send the sysadmin an email
him or her of the problem. I definitely would not try out any
sendmail exploit programs to gain root access to that system.)
(Moderator: following are some security advisories that should
especial interest to advanced newbie to intermediate hackers.)
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 10:01:25 +0100
Reply-To: Gilles Soulet <Gilles.Soulet@CST.CNES.FR>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG>
From: Gilles Soulet <Gilles.Soulet@CST.CNES.FR>
Subject: Another NT CPU Hog ?
I can put any NT server I have on its knees by just
connecting to a shared network drive on the server
(for example from a PC running Windows 95) and
transfer a large file file (>100 MBytes) from/to the server.
File transfer begins normally, but after few seconds, the
poor NT box is completely frozen. File transfer continues
normally, but eat 100% CPU time (he, sounds familiar, isn't it
Is anybody able reproduce this "bug" ?
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 16:27:31 -0700
Reply-To: Alfred Huger <ahuger@SECNET.COM>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@netspace.org>
From: Alfred Huger <ahuger@SECNET.COM>
Subject: Re: [NTSEC] CPU 100% Update
X-To: Aleph One
On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Aleph One wrote:
> Finally, on the issue of NT DNS. There was a security advisory
> by Secure Computing indicating that NT DNS could be exploited
The advisory was released by Secure Networks Inc. *Not* Secure
> results were that between DNS.EXE and SERVICES.EXE the
> was pegged at 100%.
The issue we released an advisory on was the NT DNS server
dying when it received a response for a query it never issued.
provided does not work.
> these problems, but I should warn you that this is not
a supported fix
Yep, it is in fact an unsupported patch.
> Given that DNS is one of the things that must be left
open, the fact
> that it resolves the CPU 100% utilization problem from Telnet
> connections makes it a good fix in my book. I leave it to
you to decide
> if you want to apply it or not. As yet, I have not seen
a version for
While the patch does not work for what *we* reported, it did
seem to fix
the 100% CPU usage problem. Cold comfort considering anyone,
the Internet can easily *remove* your DNS server.
Secure Networks Inc.
"Sit down before facts as a little child , be prepared to
give up every
preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and whatever abysses
leads, or you will learn nothing" - Thomas H. Huxley
EXPORTABLE CRYPTOGRAPHY TOTALLY INSECURE: CHALLENGE CIPHER
January 28, 1997 - Ian Goldberg, a UC Berkeley graduate student,
today that he had successfully cracked RSA Data Security Inc.'s
challenge cipher in just under 3.5 hours.
RSA challenged scientists to break their encryption technology,
$1000 award for breaking the weakest version of the code.
was designed to stimulate research and practical experience with
of today's codes.
The number of bits in a cipher is an indication of the maximum
security the cipher can provide. Each additional bit doubles
security level of the cipher. A recent panel of experts
using 90-bit ciphers, and 128-bit ciphers are commonly used throughout
the world, but US government regulations restrict exportable
to a mere 40 bits.
Goldberg's announcement, which came just three and a half hours
RSA started their contest, provides very strong evidence that
ciphers are totally unsuitable for practical security.
"This is the
final proof of what we've known for years: 40-bit encryption
is obsolete," Goldberg said.
The US export restrictions have limited the deployment of technology
that could greatly strengthen security on the Internet, often
both foreign and domestic users. "We know how to build
encryption; the government just won't let us deploy it.
We need strong
encryption to uphold privacy, maintain security, and support
the Internet -- these export restrictions on cryptography must
lifted," Goldberg explained. Fittingly, when
unscrambled the challenge message, it read: "This is why
you should use
a longer key."
Goldberg used UC Berkeley's Network of Workstations (known as
the NOW) to
harness the computational resources of about 250 idle machines.
him to test 100 billion possible "keys" per hour --
analogous to safecracking
by trying every possible combination at high speed. This
amount of computing
power is available with little overhead cost to students and
many large educational institutions and corporations.
Goldberg is a founding member of the ISAAC computer security
at UC Berkeley. In the Fall of 1995, the ISAAC group made
revealing a major security flaw in Netscape's web browser.
From: Keith Bostic <email@example.com>
Subject: It's very difficult to escape prosecution when your
voice is on tape
Forwarded-by: cyerkes <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Wiretappers struggle to keep lines open
BY STEPHEN LYNCH
Orange County Register
Law enforcement officials tap as many as 116 telephone lines
in Orange County, according to an FBI report that for the first
time details the pervasiveness of electronic surveillance.
The unprecedented disclosure of wiretaps nationwide is part
effort by police officers and federal agents to gain access to
high-tech phone systems, which in some cases block traditional
A 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
requires companies such as Pacific Bell and GTE to keep the lines
accessible, even as they upgrade to more reliable, digital
The FBI report, released last week, said Orange County phone
companies should allow federal, state and local authorities to
monitor up to 194 lines simultaneously, to allow for population
``Wiretap usage has been going up every year for several years,''
said Frederick Hess, director of the office of enforcement
operations in the Department of Justice. ``It's an indispensable
Hess cited Operation Zorro II, a massive drug investigation
nabbed 150 trafficking suspects in May. Officials tapped phone
lines in a dozen states, including California, to build their
case. Wiretaps also are playing a major role in a case against
Santa Ana man whom authorities allege is a member of the Mexican
``It's very difficult to escape prosecution when your voice
tape,'' Hess said. ``We had John Gotti talking about killing
people -- he's dead in the water at that point.''
That power, ironically, is threatened by clearer, faster telephone
Pacific Bell, for instance, has about 30 stations in Orange
that route calls, called ``switches.'' Each switch is being
replaced with a computer system that routes digital information.
Before, authorities could place a device on a phone line, called
``loop,'' and hear the conversation. With a digital system, all
they would hear is the sound of binary beeps, like the static
The software to translate the digits into voices at the switch
not been developed yet, as phone companies and the FBI negotiate
reasonable wiretap capacity. It's an expensive proposition, and
Ron Peat, director of federal relations for Pacific Telesis,
complained that authorities are inflating the figures and driving
up the price.
The higher the capacity for wiretaps, the more it costs, and
enforcement doesn't need access to 194 lines at each station,
``What they have done is take the busiest area of the county
made it the standard for the whole area,'' he said. ``They need
set priorities. The office in Brea may never need a wiretap.''
The last estimate by the telephone companies for a nationwide
overhaul is $2 billion. Yet Congress has authorized only $500
million for wiretap capacity, and only $100 million of that has
been released, Peat said.
Pacific Bell has not waited for the problem to be resolved.
digital switches are already in place, without the tapping
software, though Peat said no one has needed to monitor the line
The FBI took the wiretap figures from the busiest day in a
16-month period between 1993 and 1995. Orange County ranked third
in California counties for wiretaps, behind Los Angeles (1,080
one day) and San Diego (263). The total for the state is 2,569,
but officials warn that the figure is deceptive. Each county's
peak probably was reached on a different day.
The national figure, with the same caveat, is 24,617.
Wiretaps are used mainly by federal authorities, said Carl
Armbrust, chief of narcotics enforcement for the Orange County
District Attorney's Office.
``We've only used it about three times in the last few years,''
said Armbrust, who noted that state wiretap guidelines are more
restrictive than federal rules.
But the overall numbers surprised some civil libertarians
defense attorneys, who didn't realize wiretaps were so
``One hundred and sixteen? Really?'' said Allan Stokke, a
defense attorney in Santa Ana. ``That sounds really high to me.
Many, many judges seem to be giving the authority.''
Stokke worries that prosecutors are not disclosing wiretaps
evidence from them isn't introduced at trial. He added that the
technological problems ``may be a good thing. It should never
easy to intrude on people's privacy.''
But Hess said the increased tapping capacity will only keep
with the growing population, and remains a small percentage of
total number of phone lines.
``We're trying to figure out what's within reason for the
of the country,'' he said. ``These are all court-ordered taps,
nothing illicit. If we don't do this, there's going to be a big
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